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1. Introduction  
Almost all empirical analyses of competition in banking in Europe and elsewhere 
focus on indicators of industry price competition to guide their antitrust and merger 
policies. In addition to long-standing efforts to determine existing and possible future 
price competition from measures of deposit or loan market structure, direct measures-
-such as the Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-statistic, loan or deposit interest margins, and 
Lerner indices--are increasingly relied upon as ancillary information. The H-statistic 
ranks current competitive behaviour on a scale from 1.0 (perfect competition) to less 
than or equal to 0.0 (monopoly) based upon the degree to which changes in input 
prices are reflected in contemporaneous changes in unit revenues. While intermediate 
values can signal more or less competition, there is no guideline regarding the point at 
which a sufficiently competitive market becomes an insufficient one. As studies by 
De Bandt and Davis (2000), Bikker and Haaf (2002), Carbó, Humphrey and 
Rodriguez (2003), Maudos and Pérez (2003) and Carbó, Humphrey, Maudos and 
Molyneux (2008) all find evidence of (intermediate) monopolistic behaviour for 
European banking markets, this information is most useful only when combined with 
other indicators of competition. 
More direct information is contained in interest margins and Lerner indices which 
estimate the average mark-up of price over unit cost and so indicate the current level 
or change in unit profitability. Corvosier and Gropp (2002) analyse the effect of 
concentration on margins in European banking during the 1990s and find increasing 
concentration is associated with less competitive pricing of loans and sight deposits 
but greater price competition for savings and time deposits. Similarly, Fernández de 
Guevara, Maudos, and Pérez (2005) estimate Lerner indexes for the 1990s and find 
that market power in major European countries has apparently not declined despite a 
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series of market liberating measures. Finally, Maudos and Fernández de Guevara 
(2004) illustrate the importance of including deposit and loan production costs in the 
margin definition while Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2007) use Lerner indices 
to determine the social welfare loss attributable to market power. 
These price-based indicators of competition have been recently augmented with 
non-price measures of competitive behaviour under the assumption that banks may 
substitute one for the other in certain instances. For example, Pinho (2000) looks at 
advertising expenditures and branches as non-price strategic variables for Portugal, 
Kim and Vale (2001) focus on branches and their effect on loan market competition in 
Norway, Cesari and Chizzolini (2002) do the same for the deposit markets in Europe, 
while Barros (1995, 1999) uses differences in regional markets in Portugal as a 
strategic variable in the bank loan/deposit pricing decision. While Kim and Vale 
(2001), Canhoto (2004), and Coccorese (2005) focus on rivals' responses in the loan 
market and Barros (1999) and Pinho (2000) focus on similar responses in the deposit 
market, we focus on determining their separate effects and relative intensity by 
looking at both markets simultaneously (rather than in isolation).  
Potentially, there is a four-way trade-off between changes and rivals' response in 
deposit and loan pricing as well as non-price strategic efforts to alter deposit and loan 
market shares through de novo branch entry or acquisition. Although Kim and Vale 
(2001) specify that all rivals' responses occur in a national market for loans and 
Coccorese (2005) specifies a national market for only the largest banks in Italy, we 
illustrate our results using first a regional and then a national specification for the 
relevant deposit and loan markets. Within each market area loan and deposit interest 
rates and branch network structure are determined simultaneously based on 
exogeneous information and the likely response of rivals. 
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Our model is illustrated using data for the Spanish banking system during 1986-
2002. In anticipation of expanded competition following Spain’s entry into the 
European Union in 1986, restrictions on bank interest rates and geographical controls 
on branching were removed. This permitted banks to set deposit and loan rates in 
response to market conditions and to compete for deposit market share and loan 
relationships using branches as an additional strategic variable to its pricing decisions. 
As a result, price and non-price behaviour is intertwined and we provide a way to 
assess their relative importance as well as to determine the effect of rivals' responses 
by estimating conjectural variation parameters for interest rates and branches. 
Our model and its empirical specification is presented in Section 2 while Section 3 
briefly notes key price and non-price features of the Spanish banking sector and 
outlines the data and empirical approach to implement the model. Empirical results 
are discussed in Section 4 while a summary and conclusion is presented in Section 5. 
 
2. A Model of Price and Non-Price Competition 
2.1 Basic Relationships.  
Using Kim and Vale (2001)´s model as a starting point, we develop a model where 
banks can compete with rivals in prices for deposits and loans as well as branches (our 
non-price variable)1. There are n banks (i = 1,…, n) and the markets for deposits (D) 
and loans (L) are characterised by competition in prices and product differentiation 
while banks are price-takers in the purchased funds or money market (M). With product 
differentiation, the demand for loans (lit) and supply of deposits (dit) at time t is a 
function of the bank's own (rlit, rdit) and its rivals´ (rliRt, rdiRt) interest rates on these 
                                                 
1 There are three important differences w.r.t. Kim and Vale´s model: a) we include deposits and 
consequently financial costs; b) we allow competition in branches and also in loan and deposit interest 
rates; and c) we introduce conjectural variations in interest rates. 
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banking outputs,2 the size of its own (bit) and rivals' (biRt) branch network, and a vector 
of exogenous factors which may influence the overall demand of loans and deposits (zlit, 
zdit):  
 
= ( , , , , )l l lit it iRt it iRt itl l b b r r z  (1) 
= ( , , , , )d d dit it iRt it iRt itd d b b r r z . (2) 
Loans made by bank i are expected to decrease with increases in its own interest rate 
(∂lit/∂rlit < 0) and expansions of rivals' branch networks (∂lit/∂biRt < 0) but rise with 
growth in its own branch network (∂lit/∂bt > 0) and increases in rivals' loan rates 
(∂lit/∂rliRt > 0). Similarly, deposits at bank i are expected to rise with its own interest 
rate (∂dit/∂rdit > 0) and growth in its branch network (∂dit/∂bit > 0) but fall with 
increases in rivals' deposit rates (∂dit/∂rdiR < 0) and branch network growth (∂dit/∂biRt < 
0). 
 Bank production or operating cost cit (which excludes interest expenses) depends 
on the level of loan and deposit outputs3 and the price of its factor inputs wit (which 
excludes interest rates): 
( , , )it it it itc c l d w= . (3) 
 
Profits (πit) are determined from the difference between interest income and 
financial and operating costs: 
                                                 
2 The demand for loans and supply of deposits for a specific bank depends on the interest rates of the (n-
1) rival banks. With the aim of reducing the number of parameters to be estimated, we replace the (n-1) 
individual rivals' interest rates by a single condensed measure. This measure can be computed as a 
weighted average of the (n-1) rivals' interest rates: 
−
≠
= ∑1niRt j jt
j i
r w r , where w are the weights. 
3 The value of deposits are both an indicator of a pure “funding” input and as well as a “service” output 
because deposit services (payment, safekeeping) are not fully priced to users but instead are to a large 
degree traded in kind for the payment of a substantially below market rate of return. Thus a bank with 
more deposits is simultaneously providing more payment/safekeeping services to depositors.  
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π −
− −
= + −
− = − + −
−
( , , , , ) ( , , , , )
( , , ) ( ) ( , , , , ) ( ) ( , , , , )
( , , )
l l l l d d d d
it it it it iRt it iRt it it t it it it iRt it iRt it
l l l l d d d d
tit it it it it it it iRt it iRt it it it it iRt it iRt it
it it it it
r l b b r r z M r r d b b r r z
c l d w r r l b b r r z r r d b b r r z
c l d w
 (4) 
where M = l - d is the net position in the money market, and tr
−
 is the money market 
rate. 
 Banks maximize the discounted flow of profits: 
β π∞
=
= ∑0
0
i t it
t
V  
 (5) 
where β is the discount factor.  As in Kim and Vale (2001), we assume that banks use a 
feedback (Markow) strategy.  At period t they set control variables (bit, rlit, rdit) based on 
the information available at that time on the number of branches and interest rates of 
rival banks. As price is a short term decision variable and branches are a mid term one, 
banks are assumed to expect their rival to react with a lag of one period. However, it is 
assumed that banks react contemporaneously in setting interest rates. We use an 
approximation to feedback equilibrium which ignores repercussions that occur two or 
more periods ahead. 
 To maximise profits, a bank determines the number of branches and loan and 
deposit interest rates from: 
 
β
− −
− −+ + + + + +
+ + + +
+ + + +
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= − − + − − +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂− − + − − =⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
0
l dit it it it it
it t t it
it it it it it
l dit it iRt it it iRt
t it t t it
it iRt it it iRt it
V c l c d
r r r r
b l b d b
c l b c d b
r r r r
l b b d b b
 (6) 
− ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= + − − + =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
0
l
lit it it it iRt
it it tl l l l
itit it iRt it
V c l l r
l r r
lr r r r
 (7) 
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−⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= − + − − + =⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
0
d
dit it it it iRt
it t itd d d d
itit it iRt it
V c d d r
d r r
dr r r r
 (8) 
The terms in parentheses reflect the interest margin on loans ( )lr r
−− , deposits 
( )dr r
−− , and their associated marginal operating costs (∂cit/∂lit, ∂cit/∂dit). Own-price 
derivatives of demand for loans and deposits are, respectively, ∂lit/∂rlit and ∂dit/∂rdit, 
while ∂li/t∂rliRt and ∂dit/∂rdiRt represent rivals' price derivatives for the same two banking 
service outputs (loans and deposits). 
 
1iRt
it
b
b
+∂ ∂ ,
∂
∂
l
iRt
l
it
r
r and 
∂
∂
d
iRt
d
it
r
r  capture the effect from rival banks´conjectured 
reaction (conjectural variations or conduct parameters). Conjectural variations may also 
be interpreted as a measure of the departure from Nash behaviour. In the case of interest 
rates, a zero value for these terms would imply that bank i completely ignores rival 
banks in making its decisions (Nash behaviour, where firms act taking rivals' prices as 
given) and a unit value means that bank i believes that rival banks exactly match its 
decisions (cartel behaviour). When ∂riRt/∂rit < 0, conduct is more competitive than Nash 
behaviour with prices approaching marginal costs as ∂riRt/∂rit → -∞. Collusive 
behaviour is consistent with ∂riRt/∂rit > 0 suggesting that firms achieve market power 
through collusion. 
 
2.2 Empirical Specification.  
In estimating the above model, the loan demand and deposit supply functions are 
specified as log-linear relationships: 
φ φ φ φ= + + + +ln ln ln ln lnl l l l l l lit b it bR iRt r it rR iRt itl b b r r z  (9) 
φ φ φ φ= + + + +ln ln ln ln lnd d d d d d dit b it bR iRt r it rR iRt itd b b r r z  (10) 
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whereφ φ,l db b (φ φ,l dbR bR ) are the elasticity effects from bank i's own (rivals') branches 
while φ φ,l dr r ( ,l drR rRφ φ ) are the loan and deposit elasticities from bank i's own (rivals') 
loan and deposit interest rates. 
As shown in the Appendix, the derivatives of the loan demand (9) and deposit 
supply (10) functions with respect to branches and interest rates for use in (6), (7) and 
(8) along with the marginal operating costs of loans (mcl) and deposits (mcd) from a 
standard translog cost function can be included in equations (6) to (8) to express the 
profit maximization FOC as: 
 
φ φ
φ φβ α
− −
− −+ +
+ + + + + +
+ +
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− − + − − =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− − − + − −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
l d
l dit b it b
it t it t it it
it it
l d
b l dit bR it bR
t it t it t it it
iRt iRt
l d
r r mcl r r mcd
b b
l d
r r mcl r r mcd
b b
 (11)  
 
φ φ α
−⎛ ⎞− −⎜ ⎟ −⎝ ⎠ = ⎛ ⎞+⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
1
l
it t it
l l
it l l lit
r rR rl
iRt
r r mcl
r r
r
 (12) 
φ φ α
−⎛ ⎞− −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ = ⎛ ⎞+⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
1
d
t it it
d d
it d d dit
r rR rd
iRt
r mcd r
r r
r
 (13) 
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where αb = 1iRt
it
b
b
+∂ ∂ , αlr = 
∂
∂
l
iRt
l
it
r
r , α
d
r = ∂ ∂
d
iRt
d
it
r
r are the conduct parameters 
(conjectural variations). Observe that 
−⎛ ⎞− −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
l
it t it
l
it
r r mcl
r
 and 
−⎛ ⎞− −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
d
t it it
d
it
r md r
r
 are 
expressions of the Lerner Index of market power for loans and deposits, respectively4.  
In empirical implementation, the translog cost function is first estimated to 
determine the marginal operating costs5 which are then used in jointly estimating the 
first order conditions for the number of branches (11) and loan (12) and deposit (13) 
interest rates with the market shares6. Exogenous influences (zit) specified in the 
demand for loans (9) and supply of deposits (10) include the size of the market for loans 
and deposits. For each bank this variable is constructed as a weighted average of the 
market size of the provinces where the bank has branches, using as weights the relative 
importance of each province in terms of that bank's branches. Our results do not change 
if a linear time trend is added to (9) and (10) to account for economic expansion over 
the period.  
 
3.  Spanish Banking: Competitive Background and Data Description 
3.1 Spanish Banking During 1986-2002.  
The most important actions to deregulate Spanish banking were taken in the 
1980s. Controls on domestic interest rates and restrictions on branching and foreign 
                                                 
4 See Freixas and Rochet, 1997. 
5 Given output demand, costs are minimized in order to maximize profits regardless of actual market 
structure. Therefore, the estimation in a first stage of the cost function separately from first order 
conditions is reasonably consistent with the assumption of some degree of market power implicit in the 
model.  
6 The parameters to estimate are: αb and αlr, αdr (conjectural variation in branches and interest rates, 
respectively), φ φ, l db b (elasticities of loan and deposit demand w.r.t. own branches), 
φ φ,  l dbR bR (elasticities of rival branches), θ θ,  l db b (elasticities of total market demand (size)), and 
φ φ,  l dr r  (the relative loan and deposit interest rate elasticities).  
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bank entry were effectively removed over 1986-1989 in preparation for European 
integration and regulatory harmonisation. Although commercial banks already had the 
power to branch outside their regions, savings banks did not. After branching 
restrictions were lifted, savings banks rushed to enter new markets by opening new 
branches and merging with and acquiring other institutions inside and outside of their 
regions. This completely altered the domestic competitive environment. 
The variation in aggregate loan and deposit interest rates for Spain over 1986-
2002 is shown in Figure 1. During this period both commercial and savings banks 
adopted aggressive pricing strategies seeking to increase their market share of deposit 
accounts. As the initial emphasis was on attracting deposits during the late 1980s, 
both deposit and loan rates were relatively high, only to fall during the 1990s as 
pressure to expand loans--along with reduced inflation--resulted in significant 
reductions in loan and deposit rates and bank interest margins (left axis). The fall in 
interest rates led depositors to expand into mutual funds and other off-balance sheet 
savings instruments which, unlike the U.S., are almost exclusively offered by banking 
firms.  Even so, deposits grew by over 160% in real terms during this period. 
  
>Insert Figure 1 < 
 
 Figure 1 also shows the overall change in the number of branch offices which 
rose by 25% over 1986-2002 (right axis). However, savings and commercial banks 
adopted different non-price branch strategies since branches at savings banks rose by 
84% but fell by 15% at commercial banks. Fuentelsaz and Gomez (2001) note that 
savings banks initially adopted a defensive strategy prior to the lifting of branch 
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restrictions by first expanding the number of branches in their own territory and then 
later doing the same outside their regional area once this was permitted. 
 Even though the evolution of interest rates between savings and commercial 
banks was quite similar, savings banks increased their share of deposits in total 
funding by 28% over 1986-2002 (from 43% in 1986 to 54% in 2002) while 
commercial banks reduced their share by 39% (falling from 53% to 32%).7  
Commercial banks also experienced a reduction in their share of the loan market so 
that by 2002 savings and commercial banks have almost equal shares. As savings and 
commercial bank interest rates were similar over the period, the gains made by 
savings banks in the deposit and loan markets are likely primarily due to non-price 
(branch) competition.8  
 
3.2 Data and Empirical Approach.  
Our unbalanced panel data covers more than 90% of bank assets in Spain and 
contains 2,194 observations over a 17-year period. Banks with missing data needed 
for estimating our model and some where data errors seemed quite likely were 
excluded from the sample.9 Data are from reported balance sheet and profit and loss 
                                                 
7 Other funding sources account for the fact that the deposit portion of the funding shares do not add to 
100%. 
8 Recent regulatory initiatives, such as the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) of the European 
Commission, have the potential to affect bank price and non-price competition. FSAP seeks to promote 
greater integration of wholesale and retail financial activities in Europe and this can affect deposit pricing 
since wholesale (purchased) funds are funding substitutes for deposits.  As well, FSAP seeks to encourage 
the development and use of new technologies in delivering financial services which can reduce the 
competitive benefits of having a physical (branch) presence in the competition for market shares. 
9 Banks with missing data plus those with input prices and/or computed loan and deposit interest rates that 
were outside the interval of +/- 2.5 times the relevant standard deviation were dropped from the sample.  
These problems affected 36 banks. Banks with extreme values likely reflect errors in the reported data 
and typically were associated with small foreign banks. 
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accounts of commercial and savings banks published by the AEB (Asociacion 
Española de Banca) and the CECA (Confederacion Española de Cajas de Ahorros).10 
 As actual bank interest rates are not reported, yearly averages of loan (deposit) 
interest rates for each bank were estimated from ratios of loan revenues (deposit 
expenses) including fee income (expenses) to outstanding loan (deposit) values. This 
gives an average (not marginal) interest rate but, as our model is based more on the 
evolution of these prices than in their absolute level, this difference should not have a 
significant impact on our findings.11  
Marginal operating costs are calculated from estimating a translog cost function 
(17) where ci is each bank's operating costs while the input prices (w) are w1= price of 
labor (personnel costs / number of employees) and w2= price of capital (operating 
costs except personnel costs / fixed assets)12. A time dummy variable is specified to 
capture the effect of technical change. Symmetry and linear homogeneity in input 
prices restrictions are imposed. Individual fixed effects have been introduced to 
capture the effect of other variables specific of each bank.  
Data on rivals' interest rates and branches are computed in two ways. As has 
been done in Kim and Vale (2001) and Coccorese (2005), we assume that rivals' 
responses occur in a national market framework so rivals' interest rates are computed 
from the weighted average of the (n-1) rivals' interest rates. Similarly, the rivals' 
                                                 
10 Data on deposits, loans, and branches are collected from the balance sheet of each bank.  Information 
on financial and operating (personnel and other operating) expenses are collected from the profit and loss 
account of each bank. 
11 Some support here is seen from the fact that when we compute the aggregate ratio of bank loan 
revenues plus fee income to the value of loans outstanding, the evolution of this series over time closely 
approximates that of the market interest rate cited by the Bank of Spain. However, if fee income is 
excluded from this aggregate ratio, the correspondence weakens. The money market interest rate is 
assumed to be equal to the one-year interbank interest rate (source: Bank of Spain). 
12 Loans and deposits appear in the translog cost function as outputs. Branches do not appear in the cost 
function despite its impact on costs because of the strong collinearity between deposits (and loans) and 
branches.  
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branch network response to changes by bank i is determined by the sum of all bank 
branches in the country, excluding those of bank i. 
 However, except for some very large corporate loans and money market 
institutions, the intensity of competition (and consequent rivals' response) may be 
stronger and better locally identified within regional markets13. If bank i is in region p, 
then the number of rival bank branches would be the total number of branches in 
region p minus the number of branches bank i has in region p. This represents better 
the actual rivals of any bank i, whether bank i has branches nationwide or is only 
located in the region being considered. Specifically, if bank i has branches 
nationwide, only those branches in region p would be considered in this calculation. 
The calculation procedure used is shown in more detail in the Appendix (which also 
contains a table of the mean values of our data by year). The same logic applies to 
determining the rivals' loan and deposit interest rates. That is, bank i's rivals' loan and 
deposit interest rates in region p will be a weighted average of interest rates of only 
those rival banks with branches in the same region.14 
Rival banks can be identified in each of 52 provinces using data on the regional 
distribution of branch offices provided by AEB and CECA.15 As figure 2 shows, in 
the last year of our sample (2002), 16% of banks have branches in more than half of 
the 52 provinces16. Only the four largest banking entities (three commercial banks--
                                                 
13 Others papers also define local banking markets as the relevant to assess banking competition. See, for 
example, Berger and Hannan (1989 and 1998) and Hannan and Prager (2004). 
14 As noted in the text, the exception would be for very large corporate loans where the market may be 
considered more national than regional in scope. Unfortunately, data are not available by loan size in 
Spain (nor distinguished between corporate and consumer categories) so data on the value of large 
corporate loans are not available. Deposit competition is clearly local in nature rather than nationwide. 
15 We are assuming that a bank's business is distributed proportionally to its branches across the different 
provinces. As Carbó and Rodriguez (2004) show, this is quite reasonable since a high percentage of 
commercial and savings banks concentrate over 90% of their business only in one region. Other studies 
have used a distribution of branch offices over 52 provinces in Spain to compute indices of concentration, 
market size, etc.  
16 Figure 2 uses information on all Spanish commercial and savings banks, which have decreased from 
214 in 1986 to 140 in 2002. 
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BBVA, BSCH and Banesto--and one savings bank--“la Caixa”) have a presence in all 
provinces. At the other extreme, 34 commercial and saving banks have branches in 
only one province. With such differences in branch distribution, it is important to use 
a regional (provincial) approach to the measurement of rivals' branch network and 
interest rates. 
>Insert Figure 2<  
 As shown earlier in Figure 1, the evolution of loan interest rates over time 
follows a downward pattern similar to the money market rate but falling even further. 
The same pattern applies to deposits, with the net result that the spread between 
money market purchased funds and deposits is quite small toward the end of our 
period.  While the estimated marginal operating costs of loans in Figure 3 has also 
fallen over time--dropping by two-thirds--the marginal operating cost of deposits is 
rising. As a result, the ratio of loan to deposit marginal cost falls dramatically from 
5.6 in 1986 to 0.3 in 2002. Several things could explain this evolution of marginal 
costs.  On the loan side, improvements in the evaluation of loan risk (credit scoring) 
can lower loan operating expenses while mortgage loans--which are cheaper to initiate 
and service--make up a larger share of loan portfolios (rising from 21% of all loans in 
1986 to 55% in 2002). On the deposit side, the (smaller) rise in deposit marginal 
operating costs is associated with the shift of non-bank deposits in the balance sheet 
(which decreased from 50% in 1986 to 37% in 2002) to mutual funds.  In addition, 
there was an 8 percentage point increase in the relative share of sight deposits, which 
have higher payment processing expenses than time or savings deposits.  Finally, as 
branching restrictions were dropped for savings banks, they likely over-expanded 
their branch networks to gain market share (which added to operating expenses). 
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>Insert Figures 3, 4, and 5< 
 The evolution of loan ( )lr r mcl
−− −  and deposit ( )dr r mcd−− −  absolute 
margins and the (Lerner index) relative margins are shown in Figures 4 and 5. In both 
cases, loan margins rose over the period (as loan marginal cost fell) while deposit 
margins fell (as deposit marginal cost rose)17. This suggests that market power may 
have increased in loan markets while falling in deposit markets.18 Over 1997-2002, 
margins were negative in the deposit market, suggesting a loss leader pricing strategy.  
Although deposits were not a profitable product by themselves, they allowed banks to 
capture/maintain customers and, via this "tying arrangement", permit the exercise 
market power in the loan market since typically having a deposit at a bank is a 
precondition for obtaining a loan. 
 
4. Estimation Results: Price and Non-Price Effects 
4.1 Price and Non-Price Effects on Loans and Deposits.  
Initially, the system of five simultaneous equations (9), (10), (11), (12) and (13) 
was estimated applying three-stage least squares using the two-step procedure noted 
in Section 2.2. Since the interest rates on loans and deposits as well as the number of 
bank branches could be considered to be endogeneous, we initially used one-period 
lags of these three variables as instruments to deal with the possible contemporaneous 
                                                 
17 Decomposing the change in the loan absolute margin into a change in the interest spread ( −lr r ) plus a 
change in marginal costs over 1986 to 2002, the interest spread fell by 2.97 pp., the marginal cost fell by 
2.45 pp., and overall the absolute margin fell by 0.52 pp. In the case of deposits, the interest spread 
( − drr ) fell by 4.05 pp., marginal costs increased by 0.59 pp. and the absolute margin fell by 4.64 pp. 
Consequently, in both cases the evolution of absolute margins is due more to changes in interest spreads 
than changes in marginal costs. 
18 This market power result is similar to that found by Oroz and Salas (2003). These authors calculate 
relative margins using aggregate information on interest rates on new operations (marginal interest rates) 
but do not take into account marginal operating costs as we do here. Results are also in line with Maudos 
and Fernández de Guevara (2007). 
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correlation of these variables with the error terms in an un-lagged or static model.19 
Unfortunately, several problems were encountered in the resulting dynamic model: 
lack of convergence in the iteration process, a wrong sign for an own price elasticity, 
and the inability to estimate some conduct parameters due to data singularities. These 
results indicate that despite a theoretical preference for estimating a dynamic model 
with lagged variables, this approach requires too much of the available data to be 
successful. 
Since the reason for specifying the three lagged instrumental variables was to 
deal with possible contemporaneous correlation, we tested this possibility directly.  
The average correlation between the variables in the (poorly performing) dynamic 
model which contained the three lagged variables and the estimated error terms was -
0.019 while the average correlation between the variables in the (better performing) 
static model which contained no lagged variables was -0.016.  Looking at the loan 
demand and deposit supply equations separately, the average correlations in the 
dynamic model were -0.007 and 0.049, respectively, while in the static model these 
correlations were -0.019 and -0.016.  All these correlations are quite low and very 
similar.  Indeed, correcting for possible contemporaneous correlation (by using a 
dynamic model) offers no improvement in this regard over the static model.  For this 
reason, we report results using a static or contemporaneous specification for all 
variables (no lags).   
Table 1 presents the results of the model using first a regional definition of loan 
and deposit markets and then a national market definition. For both of these markets 
all estimated parameters have the expected signs and are statistically significant.20  
                                                 
19 An iterative non-linear program using the Gauss-Newton algorithm in TSP 4.5 was applied. Rival’s 
branches and interest rates are assumed to be exogenous. 
20 The only exception is for the branch conjectural variation parameter which is significant at the 89% 
level of confidence. 
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Within a regional market framework, the own price elasticity suggests that a 1% 
reduction in a bank's loan interest rate expands its loan volume by 1.46% while a 1% 
rise in its deposit rate only expands deposit volume by 0.23%. Almost identical 
elasticities are found here within a national market framework. 
 The effect on a bank's loans and deposits from changes in rivals' interest rates 
mirrors that just noted for changes in a bank's own interest rate (although of course in 
the opposite direction). That is, a 1% rise in rivals' loan interest rates expands a bank's 
loan position by 1.12% (versus a 1.46% rise with a 1% reduction in the bank's own 
loan rate). For deposits, a 1% reduction in rivals' deposit rates expands a bank's 
deposit position by 0.46% (versus a 0.23% rise with a 1% rise in the bank's own 
deposit rate). Thus, for the same 1% change there is a stronger loan response from 
changes in a bank's own loan rate than from that of rivals (and both elasticities are 
elastic) while on the deposit side changes in rivals' deposit rates generate the greater 
response (and both elasticities are inelastic).   
  These results are consistent with borrowers searching more carefully among 
lenders for their relatively infrequent and often large loan requests as opposed to 
depositors where access to a convenient location is more highly valued due to their 
more frequent (sometimes multiple times a week) use of deposit/payment/cash 
acquisition banking services. Consequently, we would expect that our non-price 
strategic variable (branches) is more important for the deposit function than for loans. 
 On a regional basis, however, a bank's own branch elasticity for loans is 0.73 
while that for deposits is 0.75 so expanding the number of branches at a bank by 1% 
expands deposits and loans by essentially the same percentage amount. This means 
that each new branch adds new loans at basically the same rate as it adds deposits 
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generating a "balanced" balance sheet. These elasticities are identical (after rounding) 
in a national market environment. 
 Even so, loans and deposits are differentially affected when rivals expand their 
branch network. The elasticity of a bank's loans to rivals' branches within regional 
markets is 0.23 while that for deposits is -.39 so rivals' branches seem to positively 
affect a bank's own loan position but reduce its deposits. As these elasticities are, 
again, almost identical within a national market framework, this unexpected result for 
loans is not due to specifying a regional versus a national market. Most likely, the 
"income effect" of rising economic growth in Spain during the period, injections of 
previously "black money" into the economy with the need to declare Peseta holdings 
to obtain Euros, and falling interest rates, offset the "substitution effect" where rivals' 
branch expansion would be expected to take away loans from existing banks rather 
than add to them. Thus we believe that the positive elasticity of bank's loans to rivals' 
branches to perhaps be the result of a relatively rapidly expanding economy rather 
than a static or declining one.21  
 In addition, running the model separately for commercial and savings banks 
reveals some important differences.22  First, the savings bank results are more robust 
and have greater overall significance.  Second, the estimated elasticity of a bank's 
loans to rivals' branches is negative (as expected) for savings banks but positive for 
commercial banks. This is consistent with savings banks' response to branch 
competition being more intense than that for commercial banks since savings bank 
branching restrictions were lifted during our time period while commercial banks 
                                                 
21 Kim and Vale (2001) only modeled the loan side and assumed a national loan market for Norway. In 
this framework, they found that rivals' branches had a significantly negative effect on a bank's loans.  
During their 8-year period (1988-1995) total loans in Norway grew by 21% while the number of branches 
fell by 20% and loans per branch expanded by approximately 51%. For the same years in Spain, loans 
grew by 89% and branches rose by 7% giving an approximate growth in loans per branch of 82%. This 
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faced no such restrictions at the time. The (unexpected) positive sign for commercial 
banks suggests that commercial bank loans rose as savings banks expanded their 
branch networks.  This differential response of loans to branch expansion suggests a 
partially segmented loan market where the expanded availability of savings banks' 
branches generates greater competition for the types of loans offered by savings banks 
but not (yet) for the broader range of loans offered by commercial banks.  
  
4.2   The Intensity of Price and Non-Price Competition.  
Conjectural variation (or conduct) parameters reflect the intensity of price and 
non-price competition. The intensity of price competition in loan and deposit markets 
is inferred from the loan rate conjectural variation of 0.90 and that for the deposit rate 
of 0.81. As both of these values are significantly different from zero, Nash behavior is 
rejected.23 Simply put, if a given bank changes its loan (deposit) interest rate in a 
regional market environment, it expects that rivals will respond by changing their loan 
(deposit) rate by 90% (81%) of the original change. Thus the matching behavior in 
terms of price competition is fairly strong.24 In principle, if these conduct parameters 
were both equal to 1.0, a bank's loan or deposit price variation would be exactly 
matched leading, most likely, to an expanded reliance on a strategy of non-price 
competition.  In this regard, strong price matching behavior is evident for years when 
loan rates rose or fell since separately estimated conjectural variations were the same 
                                                                                                                                               
difference in loan growth may be the reason why the average bank in Spain found its loans grew even as 
rivals expanded their branch networks.  
22 Although discussed, these results are not shown here. 
23 If we estimate the system of equations separately for commercial and savings banks, results show that 
market power is higher in the savings banks sector. Thus, for savings banks, the loan and deposit rate 
conjectural variations are 0.49 and 1.07, respectively. For commercial banks, the loan and deposit rate 
conjectural variations are -0.01 and 0.07, respectively, and are not statistically different from zero. 
Consequently, Nash behavior is not rejected in the commercial banks sector. The higher market power in 
the savings banks sector is in line with Fernández de Guevara and Maudos (2007) results who show how 
the Lerner index is lower in the commercial banks sector. 
24 In a national market environment, rivals' responses are 77% for loans and 86% for deposits. 
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in both cases (αlr = 1.22 for years when loan rates rose and 1.21 for years when they 
fell). This was not the case for deposits since price matching occurred in years when 
deposit rates rose (αdr = 1.49) but did not when rates fell (-0.68). 
 A common non-price strategy involves the placement of branch offices and the 
estimated conjectural variation here is 1.39 in a regional market framework (1.65 with 
a national market). When a given bank establishes a new branch it expects its regional 
(national) rivals to respond by increasing their branch network by a 1.39 (1.64) 
branches.25 Judging by the larger estimated response, non-price competition in Spain 
appears to be more intense than price competition. Although it is easy to change 
interest rates, non-price competition can be less costly since, with floating rates, price 
competition may have a greater overall effect on deposit costs and loan revenues. 
Perhaps this helps to explain why branches in Spain are small and very close to one 
another.  
 
4.3 Results After All Deregulation Was in Place.  
The deregulation process in Spain was completed by 1992. Specifically, interest 
rates and controls on fees were liberalized in 1987; branching restrictions were fully 
removed in 1989; a schedule to phase-out compulsory investment requirements was 
approved in 1989; liquidity rules were liberalized in 1990; and capital adequacy 
requirements were modified in 1992.  To see how our elasticity and conjectural 
variation results may be influenced by the use of our relatively long 17-year time 
period over 1986-2002, the data were divided into pre-1992 and post-1992 sub-
periods and the model was re-estimated. Unfortunately, data for 1986-1992 did not 
permit our non-linear simultaneous equation model to converge and, when the 
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convergence criteria was weakened, the resulting estimates contained the wrong signs. 
This problem may be due to the fact that deregulation was not yet complete in this 
earlier period so that bank competition on both a price and non-price basis was 
basically in its initial stages while, at the same time, a wave of mergers was occurring 
destabilizing the competitive reactions we are trying to estimate. Fortunately, 
estimation for the later period after deregulation was completed (1992-2002) was 
successful and the results are shown in Table 2. 
 The basic similarity of results between Tables 1 and 2 along with our inability to 
achieve reasonable estimates for the pre-1992 time period suggest that bank behavior 
during the post-1992 period drives the estimates for the entire period. Concentrating 
on the differences in results, the effect on a bank's deposits from changes in either its 
own or rivals' deposit rates have a somewhat greater impact in the post-1992 period, 
which suggests less market power26. In the loan market, the own-price elasticity falls 
indicating greater market power.  However, the effect on a bank's loan position is now 
larger for changes in rivals' loan rates. 
 In the case of branch elasticities, although the positive effect on loans and 
deposits from a bank's own branch expansion are equal to one another in the post-
1992 period (as before), the effect from rivals is to reduce both a bank's deposits (as 
before) as well as its loans. It was previously suggested that the expansion of a rival's 
branch network added to a bank's loan position--effectively expanding the entire 
market for loans. In the post-1992 period, however, the sign is reversed so branching 
by rivals takes away a bank's loan market share, a result more indicative of both a 
slower expansion of loan demand and more effective non-price competition by rivals. 
                                                                                                                                               
25 The 1.39 figure is only significantly different from zero at the 89% level of confidence while the 1.65 
value is significant at the 99% level. Either estimate is similar, but lower, than the one reported in Kim 
and Vale (2001) for Norway (2.08). 
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Turning to conjectural variations, which reflect the intensity of price and non-
price competition, within a regional market framework in the post-deregulation period 
deposit competition appears to have increased as the conduct parameter falls from 
0.81 for the entire period to 0.16 post-deregulation. However, competition seems to 
have decreased for loans (conduct parameter rises from 0.91 to 1.46). In terms of 
branches, the conduct parameter is significantly greater than zero (0.32) which means 
that banks use branches as a strategic variable.27 Nash behavior is still rejected for 
loans and branches but not for deposits. Thus while banks still exercise some form of 
market power or coordination between institutions in the loan market post-1992 and 
rely on non-price competition using their branch networks, they now seem no longer 
to (significantly) consider rivals' responses when setting deposit interest rates. 
The evolution of the Lerner index (and changes in the interest rate conjectural 
variation parameter) indicates an increase of market power in the loan market but a 
decrease in the deposit market. The Lerner index for the loan market can be written as 
1 ( / ) ( / )l lr r mcl r
−− −  permitting us to determine the relative contribution of changes in 
interest rates versus marginal cost in the overall change in the index.  From 1986 to 
2002, the contribution of interest rates ( / )lr r
−
 decreased 16 percentage points (from .62 
to .46) whereas the contribution from marginal cost ( / )lmcl r  decreased by 11 
percentage points (from .15 to .04). Thus the rise in the Lerner index for the loan 
market from 0.23 in 1986 to 0.50 in 2002 is due more to changes in loan interest rate 
behaviour than changes in marginal costs. In the deposit market, the Lerner index fell 
                                                                                                                                               
26 As expressions (12) and (13) show, the Lerner index decreases when own-price elasticities (φdr and φlr) 
increase.  
27 The same results were obtained using a national market framework except that the branch conjectural 
variation rose rather than fell.  We have more confidence in the regional market results as this is were we 
believe competition is most relevant and therefore best measured. 
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from .55 in 1986 down to -.22 in 2002 and a similar decomposition shows that this 
reduction is also due more to changes in interest rates than marginal costs.28 
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
 We have estimated an expanded model of bank oligopoly behaviour by 
incorporating price (interest rate) and non-price (branch network) competition as 
strategic variables in both the market for bank loans as well as deposits. Conjectural 
variations in this expanded framework suggest that rivals can respond to changes in 
both loan and deposit market prices as well as through branching behaviour. Using 
data for Spain over 17 years (1986-2002) and for a decade after banking deregulation 
was competed (1992-2002) to illustrate our model, we find only a few important 
differences from specifying a regional market framework (common in the U.S.) versus 
a national one (typical in European studies). The major exception occurs in estimating 
branch conjectural variation (where there is an important increase at the national 
level). 
 A regional market framework is felt to be more relevant and on this level we 
find relatively large and elastic own price (interest rate) elasticities in an average 
bank's market for loans but small and inelastic own price elasticities for deposits. As 
well, increases in rivals' loan rates was seen to add significantly to a bank's own loan 
position while a reduction in rivals' deposit rates expands a bank's deposit position.  
The latter deposit "substitution effect" is expected, of course, but the positive effect on 
a bank's loans when rivals raise--not lower--their loan rate was not. As the expected 
"substitution effect" for loans was found when the sample was shortened to the period 
                                                 
28 The deposit decomposition is ( / ) ( / ) 1d dr r mcd r
− − − .  The contribution of interest rates ( / )dr r
−
was 48 
percentage points (which fell from 1.62 to 1.14) while that from marginal costs ( / )dmcd r  was 29 
percentage points (which rose from .07 to .36). 
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after deregulation was completed (1992-2002), this suggests that either a positive or 
negative response is possible. If the credit market is expanding rapidly enough, loan 
demand at the average bank may also expand even in the face of rising interest rates at 
rival banks. Here the overall economy-driven expansion of loans offsets the price-
driven substitution effect among a bank and its rivals. In either case, however, the 
effects from a given price change in the loan market exceeds that in the deposit 
market. This is consistent with borrowers searching more carefully among lenders for 
their relatively infrequent and often large loan requests compared to depositors where 
access to a convenient location is more highly valued due to their more frequent use 
of deposit banking services. 
 In this situation, branching--our non-price strategic variable--should be more 
important in the competition for deposits than for loans. While changes in a bank's 
own branch network affect loans and deposits almost equally, the expansion of rivals' 
branch network should decrease both its loans and deposits. The expected result does 
occur for deposits but appears to have been offset (by rising economic growth and 
reduced interest rates) for loans, at least when the model is estimated for the entire 
1986-2002 period. The expected result for loans, however, occurs during the sub-
period 1992-2002 after deregulation was complete. 
 The intensity of price and non-price competition captured in our conjectural 
variation estimates suggests that when a given bank changes its loan rate, it expects 
that rivals will respond by changing their loan rate by about 90% of the original 
change. Similarly, changes in a bank's deposit rate generate changes in rivals' deposit 
rates by about 80% of the original change. Thus interest rate matching behavior seems 
fairly strong.  While strong matching behavior exists for years when loan rates rise or 
fall, the response for deposit rates has been asymmetrical.  There is strong matching 
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for years when deposit rates rise (mostly after branching restrictions were lifted and 
savings banks were competing for market share) but weak matching for years when 
they fell. 
 The closer the deposit and loan price conjectural variation parameters are to 1.0, 
the more a bank would tend to rely on a strategy of non-price competition. With the 
current level of price competition, the establishment of a new branch by a bank leads 
rivals to respond by increasing their branch network by a 1.39 branches. For the 
shorter period after deregulation was completed, strong "price matching" behavior is 
evident for loans (with a conduct parameter of 1.46) but less so for deposits (.16) or 
branches (.32). Even so, with price matching for loans, non-price competition through 
branching becomes more important in this market. 
 Our results support the view that non-price competition can play an important 
role in banking and that in Spain price competition has decreased in the loan market 
but increased in the deposit market over 1986-2002. We also find that the relative 
intensity of price versus non-price competition has varied over time, in our case after 
1992 when the country's banking sector was finally fully deregulated. Unfortunately, 
such changes in price and non-price competition makes more tenuous attempts to 
generalize to the future conjectural variation results obtained with historical 
information.  This is not unlike trying to infer market competition from changes in 
market structure without knowing how entry conditions may affect this result.  What 
this suggests is that industry measures of conjectural variation have to be kept current 
in order to be most useful. 
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Appendix 
The derivatives of the loan demand (9) and deposit supply (10) functions with respect 
to branches and interest rates for use in (6), (7) and (8) are: 
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where  αl = ∂rliRt/∂rlit,  αd = ∂rdiRt/∂rdit  are the conjectural variations in interest rates. 
 
 The marginal operating costs of loans and deposits from a standard translog cost 
function are: 
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the marginal operating costs of loans and deposits are given by: 
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Substituting (14) to (19) and (21) and (22) in (6) to (8) yields: 
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 Then the Lerner index of loans and deposits from equations (11) to (13) can be 
directly obtained from equation (23) to (25).  
 The empirical estimation of non-price rivalry involves various additional 
specifications. Rivals' branch network for bank i in region (province) p (biRp) is 
calculated as: 
1n
iRp jp
i j
b b
−
≠
= ∑ .         (26) 
When a given bank i has branches in different regions, the rivals' branch network for 
bank i in all regions where bank i is located is computed as a weighted average of 
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rivals' branch network in each region, using as weights the regional branch 
distribution of bank i:29 
ip
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p ip
p
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b b
b
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑ .        (27) 
 In the case of loan and deposit interest rates, rivals' interest rates in each region p 
are calculated as:30 
1
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and the rivals' interest rate for bank i in all regions is computed as a weighted average 
of rivals' interest rates in each province: 
ip
iR iRp
p ip
p
b
r r
b
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∑ ∑ .        (29) 
 Descriptive statistics (means) of the variables used are in Table A1. 
>Insert table A1< 
 
  
                                                 
29 We compute rivals' bank network and interest rates separately for each year. To calculate rivals' interest 
rates, for each bank in each year, a weighting matrix with (n-1)xp elements is computed. Over the period 
1986-2002, a matrix with n*(n-1)*T*p elements (almost 20 million) is computed.  
30 Having no information to do otherwise, we assume that banks set the same interest rates across their 
branches. 
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Figure 1: Interest rates and number of bank branches in Spain 
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Figure 2. Number of provinces in which each bank has branches  
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Source: Own elaboration from AEB, CECA and Bank of Spain
Figure 3. Operating Marginal costs
Figure 5. Relative Margins
Figure 4. Absolute Margins
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Table 1: Empirical results (1986-2002)
Estimate s.e Estimate s.e.
Constant (loan demand equation) 5.164 ** 0.226 5.120 ** 0.232
Elasticity of loans w.r.t. own branches (Φ l b ) 0.728 ** 0.017 0.734 ** 0.016
Elasticity of loans w.r.t. rival branches (Φ l bR ) 0.227 ** 0.035 0.252 ** 0.036
Elasticity of own loan interest rate (Φ l r ) -1.457 ** 0.100 -1.487 ** 0.097
Elasticity of rival loan interest rate (Φ l rR ) 1.117 ** 0.119 1.271 ** 0.125
Loan market size 0.104 ** 0.023 0.113 ** 0.024
Constant (deposit suppy equation) 1.730 ** 0.358 1.713 ** 0.342
Elasticity of deposits w.r.t. own branches (Φ d b ) 0.749 ** 0.017 0.751 ** 0.016
Elasticity of deposits w.r.t. rival branches (Φ d bR ) -0.389 ** 0.043 -0.382 ** 0.043
Elasticity of own deposit interest rate (Φ d r ) 0.230 * 0.098 0.233 ** 0.079
Elasticity of rival deposit interest rate (Φ l rR ) -0.463 ** 0.123 -0.467 ** 0.111
Deposit market size 0.650 ** 0.041 0.649 ** 0.039
Conjectural variations in loan interest rate (α l ) 0.901 ** 0.056 0.770 ** 0.046
Conjectural variations in deposit interest rate (α d ) 0.810 ** 0.118 0.860 ** 0.128
Conjectural variations in branches (α b ) 1.390 0.856 1.648 ** 0.624
N. obs. 1688 1688
** Parameter significant at the 99% level of confidence; * Parameter significant at the 95% level of confidence
Note: standard errors computed from heteroskedastic-consistent matrix (Robust -White)
Rival´s variables at national 
level
Rival´s variables at regional 
level
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Table 2: Empirical results (1993-2002)
Estimate s.e. Estimate s.e.
Constant (loan demand equation) 0.711 0.428 0.868 0.444
Elasticity of loans w.r.t. own branches (Φ l b ) 0.757 ** 0.021 0.750 ** 0.021
Elasticity of loans w.r.t. rival branches (Φ l bR ) -0.818 ** 0.074 -0.854 ** 0.071
Elasticity of own loan interest rate (Φ l r ) -1.112 ** 0.114 -0.884 ** 0.093
Elasticity of rival loan interest rate (Φ l rR ) 1.420 ** 0.164 1.239 ** 0.159
Loan market size 1.017 ** 0.064 1.035 ** 0.062
Constant (deposit suppy equation) -1.602 ** 0.621 -0.912 0.567
Elasticity of deposits w.r.t. own branches (Φ d b ) 0.782 ** 0.023 0.781 ** 0.023
Elasticity of deposits w.r.t. rival branches (Φ d bR ) -1.014 ** 0.080 -0.863 ** 0.073
Elasticity of own deposit interest rate (Φ d r ) 0.457 ** 0.109 0.349 ** 0.088
Elasticity of rival deposit interest rate (Φ l rR ) -0.645 ** 0.140 -0.618 ** 0.141
Deposit market size 1.182 ** 0.076 1.048 ** 0.069
Conjectural variations in loan interest rate (α l ) 1.466 ** 0.116 1.366 ** 0.135
Conjectural variations in deposit interest rate (α d ) 0.164 0.139 0.131 0.160
Conjectural variations in branches (α b ) 0.317 ** 0.041 2.874 ** 0.288
N. obs. 958 958
** Parameter significant at the 99% level of confidence; * Parameter significant at the 95% level of confidence
Note: standard errors computed from heteroskedastic-consistent matrix (Robust -White)
Rival´s variables at national 
level
Rival´s variables at regional 
level
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Table A.1: Descriptive statistics (Means)
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
lit (loans) thounds of euros 1,348 1,318 1,537 1,716 1,840 2,083 2,520 2,960 2,760 2,901 3,115 3,336 4,092 4,964 5,521 4,795 6,265
dit (deposits)  thounds of euros 1,847 1,862 2,144 2,263 2,379 2,578 3,158 3,505 3,482 3,588 3,792 3,932 4,758 5,785 6,315 5,510 6,895
rl it(loan interest rate) 0.182 0.186 0.172 0.172 0.177 0.174 0.164 0.154 0.125 0.129 0.122 0.100 0.088 0.074 0.078 0.081 0.070
rd it (deposit interest rate) 0.077 0.076 0.071 0.082 0.090 0.092 0.084 0.086 0.062 0.069 0.063 0.046 0.036 0.025 0.032 0.036 0.029
Regional rl iRt (rivals´ loan interest rate) 0.190 0.196 0.181 0.182 0.191 0.181 0.167 0.158 0.136 0.138 0.130 0.105 0.090 0.078 0.084 0.086 0.074
Regional rd iRt (rivals´deposit interest rate) 0.069 0.068 0.063 0.073 0.084 0.086 0.081 0.080 0.061 0.066 0.061 0.045 0.037 0.029 0.035 0.035 0.029
National rl iRt (rivals´ loan interest rate) 0.177 0.184 0.174 0.176 0.186 0.176 0.163 0.153 0.131 0.131 0.125 0.100 0.089 0.077 0.084 0.086 0.075
National rd iRt (rivals´deposit interest rate) 0.072 0.071 0.066 0.077 0.088 0.088 0.082 0.083 0.065 0.067 0.064 0.047 0.039 0.030 0.037 0.037 0.030
bit (number of branches per bank) 154 150 166 166 167 181 218 197 195 202 214 218 259 302 314 282 332
Regional brRt (rivals´branch network) 1,386 1,454 1,424 1,613 1,762 1,927 1,740 1,855 1,899 2,044 2,063 2,167 1,972 1,876 1,948 1,943 1,960
National brRt (rivals´branch network) 27,623 28,009 28,793 29,566 30,353 30,999 31,230 31,689 31,773 32,551 33,217 34,053 34,829 34,889 34,902 34,372 34,112
Number of banks 177 175 169 179 178 171 141 148 146 149 144 145 125 116 112 107 103
Source: AEB, CECA and own elaboration  
 
 
 
 
 
